The confrontation between US President Donald Trump and Iran has evolved into something far more complex than a nuclear standoff or a postponed military strike. It has become, in the words of critics, a “mutilated war” — entered with incomplete intelligence and flawed military calculations that failed to anticipate Iran’s asymmetric response strategy.
Washington discovered too late that Iran has no intention of fighting on American or Israeli terms. Instead, Tehran has chosen to wage its campaign in what it perceives as weaker, more vulnerable arenas: the Arab Gulf states.
Iran’s Gulf Strategy: A Doctrine Decades in the Making
Iran cannot deliver direct revenge against the United States or a decisive blow to Israel without risking its own existence. So it has chosen an alternative path: targeting the Gulf.
This is not a temporary tactical adjustment, but rather a reflection of Iranian strategic doctrine that has governed Tehran’s thinking for decades — one that seeks submissive Arab Gulf states, remains haunted by the Iraq war legacy, and rejects the liberal vision of Gulf monarchies.
Tehran’s calculus is simple: The Gulf is a backyard that can be showered with drones and missiles at low cost, using proxies in Iraq and elsewhere when direct confrontation with major powers proves too risky.
| Iran’s Strategic Position | Implication |
|---|---|
| Cannot strike US directly without existential cost | Targets Gulf states instead |
| Cannot defeat Israel without massive retaliation | Uses asymmetric proxy warfare |
| Views Gulf as historical sphere of influence | Deploys drones/missiles via proxies |
| Doctrine shaped by Iraq war experience | Avoids direct confrontation, prefers attrition |
Gulf States’ Desperate Appeal
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and other Gulf nations have appealed to Trump not to rush into major military strikes. Their reasoning is stark: broad American military operations against Iran would make them the first victims of Iranian retaliation — not Washington or Tel Aviv.
These states requested time not out of naive faith in Iranian flexibility, but to test whether Tehran could be persuaded to retreat from its suicidal course before a regional war explodes.
Some in Washington interpreted the Gulf request as an opportunity to buy time before major military operations. Others suggested that Gulf states requested postponement because this aligned with Trump’s own hesitation over resuming the war.
But the Pentagon has drawn a line: Waiting is not a strategy. Trump must decide between military action or a clear exit that saves face.
The “Seven Keys” Option
Trump now faces a delicate equation. Shuttle diplomacy and elastic negotiations no longer benefit him — they harm him because time is running out. Iran will not surrender on core nuclear issues unless it fully understands what Trump holds in his military arsenal.
Among the options is what Washington calls the “seven keys” — a complex, cumulative operation designed to inflict a serious defeat on Iran, not merely a symbolic strike.
Target List of “Seven Keys” Operation:
- Energy infrastructure — Oil facilities, refineries, export terminals
- Communications networks — Command and control systems
- Strait of Hormuz installations — Naval bases, coastal defenses
- Nuclear research sites — Enrichment facilities, research centers
- IRGC command centers — Revolutionary Guard leadership facilities
- Military bases — Air defense, missile sites
- Leadership targets — Potential strikes on political/military leadership
Intelligence Failure: The Putin-Ukraine Parallel
The central problem is that this war was not sufficiently studied in light of Iran’s explicit threats to turn it into a regional conflagration. Responsibility falls on American and Israeli intelligence for failing to present Trump with the true picture.
The parallel is striking: Vladimir Putin’s miscalculations when he entered Ukraine expecting a swift, limited war that became historic attrition. Trump now faces a similar possibility — a major strike may achieve tactical military objectives but could open regional doors Washington was not prepared to contain.
The error was not only in estimating Iranian military capabilities, but in misreading the doctrine that governs Tehran’s leadership and the revenge they have publicly vowed.
Critical Questions Unanswered:
- Did the Trump administration rush into war without calculating that Iranian retaliation would target Gulf states’ deep infrastructure, not just American bases?
- Was this arbitrariness, a hidden agenda, or a grave failure inside American intelligence and military institutions?
- Did Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff misunderstand Tehran’s mentality and IRGC doctrine, or were they absorbed in chasing financial benefits from a hoped-for deal?
- Is this debacle due to Trump’s narcissistic personality and personalization of America’s grand decisions, tainted by his appetite for money and deals — or a deeper structural problem in the United States?
The Negotiation Challenge: Ahmad Vahidi
Iran’s main negotiator, IRGC Commander Ahmad Vahidi, embodies the difficulty of reaching a real agreement. He comes from a doctrine that rejects concession and surrender.
Negotiating with Vahidi means negotiating with a ruling structure that:
- Considers flexibility a sign of weakness
- Views revenge as both a political and military tool
- Will not make real concessions unless convinced the American “seven keys” are not verbal threats but a ready plan to strike leadership, military, oil, nuclear, and communications capabilities
The Gulf’s Core Concern
Any document limited to the nuclear file will be incomplete if it ignores Iranian missiles, drones, and proxies. The Gulf states have a problem with Iran’s proxies as much as with the nuclear file, because the daily danger comes from these arms and the doctrine of revenge behind them.
Trump needs an exit that justifies why he entered this war and why he may leave it. He wants to emerge almost victorious, while Iran wants to claim it did not surrender.
Saving face is essential for both parties — but it is not enough if:
- Iran remains in control of the Strait of Hormuz
- Tehran dictates its conditions in the nuclear file
- The Islamic Republic retains freedom to use its arms against Arab states
Words and semantics may allow Trump to postpone or cancel the strike, but they cannot cover a deficient document devoid of addressing Iran’s regional threats.
China and Russia: Strategic Beneficiaries
China and Russia are present in this scene, each with strategic pacts with Iran and deep interests with Gulf states.
China’s Role:
- Entered negotiations to help Pakistan and encourage Tehran toward flexibility
- Will not be an official guarantor of any US-Iranian agreement
- Closer to telling Iranian leaders to stop seeking Hormuz hegemony and avoid open regional confrontation
- Fluent in the language of interests; long-term strategic asset considerations may force another course
- Trump’s original goal: Dislodge China and Russia from Iran — Result: Failed due to bad war management and hesitation
Russia’s Position:
- Benefited from renewed need for its oil and gas
- Europe appears the biggest loser, forced to knock on Moscow’s doors before winter to buy Russian gas
Strategic Winner: China
- Appears as the calm great power receiving presidents and managing balances
- United States appears volatile, tense, and unable to convert military power into calculated political results
| Country | Strategic Position | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| China | Strategic pact with Iran + Gulf interests | Greatest beneficiary; appears as stable power broker |
| Russia | Energy leverage with Europe | Benefited from oil/gas demand surge |
| United States | Military superiority + Gulf alliances | Appears indecisive; failed to dislodge China/Russia from Iran |
| Europe | Energy dependency | Biggest loser; forced back to Russian gas |
A Transitional Moment of Extreme Danger
We stand before a transitional moment of extreme danger. Washington is trying to formulate a document that saves Trump’s face without appearing to have bought time for Iran. China and Russia are revisiting their strategic investment in Iran. Tehran is proud it did not surrender while preparing to punish the Gulf if struck.
Time is no longer an opportunity — it is a cost. The war is no longer a test for Iran alone, but for the United States.
This predicament exposes two alarming realities:
- The danger of Trump’s personalization of wars and financial markets — concentrating grand strategic decisions in one individual’s hands
- An organic defect in American intelligence and military institutions — failing to provide accurate assessments and strategic foresight
In both cases, the United States could pay the price of a strategic mishap opened by an arbitrary, incomplete war — possibly awaiting surprises with even greater losses.
The Bottom Line
The US-Iran confrontation has evolved into a test of American strategic competence, intelligence reliability, and presidential decision-making. What began as a nuclear standoff has become a regional crisis with global implications.
Key takeaways:
- Gulf states remain vulnerable to Iranian retaliation regardless of US military superiority
- Intelligence failures mirror Putin’s Ukraine miscalculations
- China and Russia emerge as strategic beneficiaries of American indecision
- Any agreement limited to nuclear issues will fail to address Gulf security concerns
- Time pressure now favors Iran, not the United States
The question is no longer whether Trump can achieve military objectives, but whether the United States can convert military power into a calculated political result — or whether this “mutilated war” will become another chapter in American strategic overreach.
About the Author: Raghida Dergham is a veteran journalist and founder of Beirut Institute. She has covered Middle East politics and US foreign policy for over four decades.
